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When New York celebrated its ratification of the United States Constitution on July 
23, 1788, it threw a parade that proceeded by profession—farmers, butchers, coopers, cab-
inet makers, ship wrights, cartmen, gentlemen of the bar, public officials, and other occu-
pations all had a place.1 It is a colorful illustration of constitutionalism outside the courts. 
Various approaches in law and courts literature have enabled us to recognize this parade 
as such. The studies of constitutional moments, departmentalism, and popular constitu-
tionalism have all invited us to consider the dynamics of constitutional change and legiti-
mation, the presence of power and politics, the importance of structure to the framing of 
constitutional discourse, unconventional processes, alternatives or complements to the le-
gal constitution, and the democratic features of the constitutional order.2 
Despite all of that literature, there has remained one vague actor—the popular sov-
ereign. We the People have a critical role to play in constitutional dynamics, and phenom-
ena, such as critical elections, have served as the mechanism for The People to confer 
legitimacy. But the invocation of The People raises as many questions as it answers—Are 
these people The People? Are these paraders representative? Are their decisions, truly, the 
wishes of The People? Were those occupations in the 1788 ratification parade representa-
tive of The People? Was the list of occupations aspirational? A simple nod to mollify the 
public? 
Elizabeth Beaumont’s The Civic Constitution, Kristin Goss’s The Paradox of Gen-
der Equality, and John Finn’s Peopling the Constitution are poised to answer or redirect 
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 1. Richard Platt, Order of Procession, in Honor of the Constitution of the United States, in  FORGING A 
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT - CREATING THE UNITED STATES - LIBRARY OF CONGRESS (George 
Washington et al., 1788), available at http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/creating-the-united-states/forging-a-federal-
government.html#obj2 (accessed Sept. 1, 2014). 
 2. See LARRY KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 
(2004); BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE, VOLUME II: TRANSFORMATIONS (2000); WALTER F. MURPHY, 
CONGRESS AND THE COURT (1962). 
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such questions by attending to the Civic Constitution.3 Finn coined the phrase, defining 
the Civic Constitution as “an approach to the Constitution of the United States that em-
phasizes its status as a constitutive political act.”4 Drawing from constitutional theory, po-
litical theory, feminist theory, public policy, and historical analysis, these studies empha-
size the intrinsic importance of civic life in constitutionalism. They invite us to place 
citizenship at the center of our study of constitutionalism and, furthermore, to consider 
constitutionalism in terms of foundational values. They can explain why it is significant 
that the New York ratification parade proceeded by occupation, and what that tells us about 
The People whom the Constitution serves and constructs. 
The actors in the civic constitutionalism are who you might think—civic groups or 
ordinary citizens in civil society. As an alternative to (but a necessary companion to) the 
legalistic language and legally-focused framing of problems in the Juridic Constitution,5 
the Civic Constitution also includes “noncanonical” texts. As President Lincoln asserted 
(and is now generally accepted), The Declaration of Independence is a Founding document 
whose commitments guide the interpretation of the formal Constitution.6 Beaumont draws 
from petitions, newspapers, and pamphlets of activists that can be used to contest questions 
of justice and consider incorporating new principles.7 Goss focuses on the congressional 
testimony of women’s groups that reflect women’s “civic place.”8 
Beaumont places civic groups as key actors in a series of “Refoundings”—the dawn-
ing revolutionary period, the ratification period, the abolitionist movement, and the woman 
suffragist movement.9 This sequence is a departure from Bruce Ackerman’s Foundings, 
and, indeed, Beaumont’s and Ackerman’s studies have different purposes. Where Acker-
man identifies the dynamic process that led to the expansion of federal power,10 Beaumont 
is concerned about the changing composition of the popular sovereign. In each of her Re-
foundings, civic groups developed innovative constitutional views, contested the status 
quo, wrought changes to the texts, ideals, and norms of the U.S. Constitution, and ex-
panded membership of the popular sovereign.11 
The groups that Beaumont studies are not unfamiliar, but she places them in a posi-
tion not usually granted to them. In Beaumont’s work, these are not merely enthusiastic 
citizens, not merely agitators. They are Founders. It is commonplace to see these groups 
as expanding the capacity of terms such as liberty, equality, or justice, but for Beaumont, 
there is more to this enterprise. In each case, these civic groups contributed to a casting of 
a new community and the foundational commitments of that community.12 It is not just 
that rights were extended to white farmers, or to blacks, or to women, but that in each case 
                                                          
 3. ELIZABETH BEAUMONT, THE CIVIC CONSTITUTION: CIVIC VISIONS AND STRUGGLES IN THE PATH 
TOWARD AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2014); KRISTIN A. GOSS, THE PARADOX OF GENDER EQUALITY: HOW 
AMERICAN WOMEN’S GROUPS GAINED AND LOST THEIR PUBLIC VOICE (2012); JOHN E. FINN, PEOPLING THE 
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 4. FINN, supra note 3, at 1.  
 5. See FINN, supra note 3. 
 6. Id. at 50-52. 
 7. BEAUMONT, supra note 3, at 4.  
 8. See GOSS, supra note 3, at 9-10.  
 9. See BEAUMONT, supra note 3, at 5.  
 10. See ACKERMAN, supra note 2.  
 11. BEAUMONT, supra note 3, at 2. 
 12. Id. at 6. 
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the popular sovereign—We the People who cast legitimacy on the constitutional order—
was reconfigured.13 When new groups were recognized as members of the popular sover-
eign, The People fundamentally altered their national identity and recommitted to their 
newly shared commitments.14 
Groups in the late colonial period—organizing by trade, by church, in taverns, on 
waterfronts, and in public squares—boycotted, petitioned, and mobbed.15 They propagated 
new perspectives on the rule of law and civil disobedience.16 In doing so, they reconstituted 
the notion of self-rule.17 The contribution of such groups becomes quite clear in Beau-
mont’s study of the Reconstruction Amendments, which are typically attributed to Radical 
Republicans. In her analysis, the prior decades of abolitionism set these amendments into 
motion.18 The abolitionists are the ones who invited new ways of thinking about funda-
mental law.19 The civic actors in Beaumont’s Refoundings play the long game: They might 
not even be around to see their ideas become incorporated as fundamental principles. 
Beaumont’s account of the woman suffrage movement drives that point home. The 
ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment was followed by a “postsuffrage crash” in 
women’s political efficacy.20 For Beaumont, this story of decline detracts from the contri-
bution. Woman suffragists contested fundamental public-private relationships of the con-
stitutional order.21 They redrew the boundaries of citizenship.22 From this perspective, the 
ultimate constitutional contribution of the woman suffrage movement is not suffrage but 
the transformation in the civic membership of women and the shared principles that the 
entire polity committed to when it included women.23 
Goss likewise takes on the story of decline by challenging the “wave” metaphor and 
the corresponding “crash” that purportedly followed both the first and second wave 
women’s movements.24 She gauges the strength of women’s participation by following the 
congressional testimony of women’s groups from 1870 to 2000.25 She draws different con-
clusions about each crash, capturing the distinction in her opening anecdote. In 1948, 
women’s groups gave testimony before Congress in support of the Marshall Plan.26 This 
may come across as a surprising fact, and it should be—Goss finds that, by the 1990s, 
women’s groups were rarely present at foreign policy hearings.27 The difference tells us 
much about the periods after the peak of the first and second wave feminist movements. 
Goss explains that the women’s movement did not dismantle after the Nineteenth 
                                                          
 13. Id.  
 14. Id. at 7.  
 15. Id. at 4. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 62. 
 18. Id. at 120.  
 19. Id. 
 20. GOSS, supra note 3, at 28.  
 21. See GRETCHEN RITTER, THE CONSTITUTION AS SOCIAL DESIGN: GENDER AND CIVIC MEMBERSHIP IN 
THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER (2006). 
 22. BEAUMONT, supra note 3, at 168. 
 23. Id. at 186. 
 24. GOSS, supra note 3, at 7. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 1.  
 27. Id. at 2. 
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Amendment.28 Replacing the “wave” metaphor with that of a river,29 Goss follows the 
tributaries, where she finds plenty of civic activity after 1920. There was a multiplicity of 
groups working for both women’s issues and staking claim to broader national issues, such 
as war and democracy.30 Furthermore, these groups were membership-based, with local 
chapters and active participation, working their way up to a national presence that testified 
on Capitol Hill.31 Goss thus identifies ongoing, vibrant civic engagement after 1920. In 
contrast, the period after the peak of the second wave women’s movement shows women’s 
groups that tend to be professional organizations focused more narrowly on specific 
women’s issues.32 Testimony before Congress dropped, and the scope of women’s groups’ 
claims narrowed as well.33 Goss identifies this as a loss of women’s civic place, which 
“encompasses the civic identity on which groups draw to construct their interests and jus-
tify their political authority, the modes of collective action that groups deploy to press 
those interests, and the policy niche that groups legitimately occupy.”34 
Women’s inclusion invited women’s participation, but that inclusion and participa-
tion also allowed the state to shape women’s civic membership. Policies of the 1960s (The 
Presidential Commission on the Status of Women, the Equal Pay Act, and the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964) made liberal feminism dominant and reshaped women’s civic place with 
more professionalized groups focused on women’s rights.35 Goss is quite careful to parse 
out what is problematic about the change in and decline of women’s collective engage-
ment. She is not railing against special interests or identity politics. While she uses the 
sameness/difference debate to analyze how women’s groups became narrowed, she does 
not stop there.36 Goss is pinpointing the decline of civic place, shift in civic membership, 
and change of voice.37 For Goss, this is about citizenship. Once women were included as 
members of the popular sovereign (in Beaumont’s account), they participated and were, in 
turn, shaped by the process.38 The rumored decline did not occur after 1920, but a certain 
sort of decline did occur in the 1980s.39 Parsing out the distinction between the afterlife of 
the two waves of feminism, through a civic lens, allows the reader to see a vibrant—if 
diversified—women’s movement after 1920 and a breakdown of its strengths in the late 
twentieth century. The problem, then, is a civic one. 
As all three of these studies suggest, civic problems are constitutional problems. 
John Finn presents his ideas on the Civic Constitution with a set of essays: “Constituting,” 
“Maintaining,” and “Failing.”40 The essay form of the book is innovative and reflective of 
its subject, inviting a less formal (but not informal) tone that raises questions and opens up 
the mind to consideration of civic possibilities and all of the work that it does to sustain a 
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 30. Id. at 40-41. 
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 32. Id. at 99. 
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 34. Id., at 10. 
 35. Id. at 79-80. 
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civic constitutional order.41 The Civic Constitution is distinct from the Juridic Constitu-
tion, but Finn is not promoting it as an alternative.42 Sustaining the Princeton School’s 
appreciation for law as well as politics, Finn makes it clear that the Juridic Constitution is 
necessary, but insufficient on its own, to constitute and maintain a constitutional order.43 
Like the other authors, Finn is keen on civic engagement as the avenue for partici-
pation in constitutional interpretation, although he goes further to emphasize civic respon-
sibility. As Finn sees it, civic constitutionalism places a burden on the citizenry to “shoul-
der a significant part of the responsibility for achieving and maintaining a constitutional 
way of life.”44 Lest we mistake this point for thick constitutionalism or robust democracy, 
the civic activity is likely to have been part of civil society, anyway. Civic constitutional-
ism finds citizens where they are. The constitutional order, in turn, has the responsibility 
to cultivate the structures and environment that will maintain a culture that fosters that 
activity.45 The constitutional order must provide a civic education that prepares citizens to 
engage in critical reflection46 and to understand the role of contestation in political life to 
prepare them for “dissident citizenship.”47 Citizens must be given “opportunities and in-
centives to participate in public life,”48 particularly through local associations.49 Such ed-
ucational and associational institutions need to be maintained in order to foster civic par-
ticipation and inquiry into constitutional questions.50 The localized rule of self is built up 
to rule by the people.51 
Like the other authors, Finn is concerned about the identity produced by constitutive 
acts. As we see in Beaumont, in particular, inclusion of one group affects the identity of 
the whole community. For Finn, constitutional questions “do not reduce to questions of 
legality, technicality, or judicial interpretation, but are instead questions about who we are 
and to what we are committed.”52 Like Beaumont, these questions of identity are arrived 
at through contestation. That is why it is so important to provide a civic education that 
does not teach mere facts but poises citizens to deal with difference and to reflect on their 
shared commitments. 
Beaumont and Finn depart on the timing of this contestation. Beaumont is concerned 
with Refoundings, a framework that insists that we take inclusion seriously and as a col-
lective enterprise. The granting of woman suffrage, for example, was not just a victory for 
women; it affected everyone. Extending the franchise or civic membership changes those 
in the privileged position. They now agree to the values that come with the act of inclusion. 
They are now part of The People who broke down the public-private distinction and let go 
of the old social ordering that gendered status had accomplished. Identifying that agree-
ment as a Refounding makes sense and makes us take notice of the shared consequences 
                                                          
 41. Id. at 28. 
 42. Id. at 3-4. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 1. 
 45. Id. at 107.  
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 118, 121. 
 48. Id. at 117 
 49. Id. at 119. 
 50. Id. at 121. 
 51. Id. at 79. 
 52. Id. at 123. 
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of inclusion. 
On the other hand, the Founding trope invites us to reserve such constitutive mo-
ments for Foundings. What about periodic constitutional politics? What about ongoing 
questions and controversies? Finn’s attention to maintenance is able to account for ordi-
nary affairs and the fostering of structures and thinking that produce the civic contestation 
that Beaumont describes.53 Where do civic groups such as Beaumont’s come from? Finn 
can lead us toward sources, both in the training of citizens and in maintaining a disposition 
of questioning and engagement.54 As for the period after inclusion, constitutional mainte-
nance invites citizens to remain in the game of constitutional interpretation, not abdicating 
that responsibility to the courts.55 An attitude of belonging to the interpretative community 
and a willingness to challenge others can raise attention to those shared commitments, 
again and again.56 The People may reaffirm them or reconsider those shared commit-
ments.57 Finn is just as concerned with shared identity as Beaumont is, but he finds the 
spaces to the make issues of identity part of a constitutional way of life. 
Both Finn and Goss provide guides to maintenance. Goss’s study cautions against 
being satisfied with the act of inclusion, for increased participation invites the state to 
shape, and possibly reduce, citizens’ civic capacities and political strengths. Finn looks for 
“both opportunities and incentives to engage in public life.”58 The cautionary tales in his 
chapter on constitutional failure59 make it clear that strict formalism, civility that avoids 
disagreement, and abdication of interpretive responsibility are all liabilities of a constitu-
tional order.60 
When we recognize that civic life is intrinsic to the constitutional order, then the 
tools of political science become useful in constitutional theory in new ways. Goss’s use 
of policy feedback is able to capture the reshaping of women’s participation in congres-
sional testimony and offer a nuanced account of the civic and political health of women’s 
groups. A civic perspective allows us to see privatization not in terms of economic theory 
or ideologically but as a constitutional issue: the professional, staff-led organizations of 
the late twentieth century may have plenty of expertise, but women’s groups lost the merits 
of membership-based federations, which imparted self-rule into political participation.61 
Finn, too, values local associations.62 The associations themselves provide a structure in 
constitutional architecture.63 Localism contributes to a civic culture.64 The Civic Constitu-
tion happens on the ground, finding The People where they are, and engagement starts 
there. In short, from the perspective of these authors, “bowling alone”65 would be not just 
                                                          
 53. Id. at 53-54. 
 54. Id. at 91. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 117. 
 59. See id. at 191-215 (discussing what he terms “constitutional rot” in relation to the antiterrorism efforts 
after September 11, 2001). 
 60. See id. at 218-19. 
 61. GOSS, supra note 3, at 78-79. 
 62. FINN, supra note 3, at 117, 125. 
 63. Id. at 54. 
 64. Id. at 85. 
 65. See ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY 
(2000). 
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a political problem, but a constitutional problem, what Finn calls “constitutional rot” in 
his account of constitutional failure.66 Finn’s attention to failure raises the stakes, but the 
resources for recovery are all at hand—in civic life and in the tools of the discipline, if 
only they would be directed toward constitutional questions. 
These studies go a long way to explaining why status issues, such as race and gender, 
are not peripheral issues in studies of constitutionalism. Inclusion is more than the exten-
sion of rights and recognition, once we recognize that the entire community is reshaped. 
The focus on identity and civic place in all of these works makes it clear that changes in 
status for one group matter for everyone. Such work could be continued by attending to 
the connection between ideas and institutions.67 If women’s inclusion broke down the sep-
arate spheres doctrine, then where did that emerge, institutionally? Such questions would 
help us to reconcile Beaumont’s Refoundings with Ackerman’s Foundings, connecting 
issues of identity with issues of constitutional authority. 
These studies are a welcome addition to the law-and-politics approach to constitu-
tionalism. If law and politics has suggested that we reduce our reverence for a legalistic 
constitution as well as any romantic attachment to the Founding Fathers,68 then civic con-
stitutionalism replaces any romantic notions we might have about popular constitutional-
ism. Rather than feel the need to identify The People with precision, or ratchet up their 
political participation, civic constitutionalism starts with citizens’ lived experience. It finds 
citizens where they are—in their associations at work, in church, in civil society. The im-
peratives of a civic constitution require civic engagement, but it does not rest on any ideal 
theory of citizenship. It is about citizens engaging in their own lives. A constitutional order 
need not impel citizens to participate at critical junctures, but, rather, maintain the condi-
tions so that they dig a little deeper into their own affairs—participating in their own self-
rule—and extend that until they are engaged with others and with constitutional questions. 
This is the elemental stuff of citizenship. Health is gauged not by output but by moments 
along the way—the richness of education, the dynamics of participation, and the ability to 
give voice. 
Returning to New York’s 1788 ratification parade, we see the contributions of each 
of these authors. Beaumont’s work draws our attention to the particular actors—white 
men, common folk, and elite—together, celebrating their long-fought victory over the re-
definition of rule of law and liberties. Goss’s work invites us to look at the parade as a 
civic place, with the various occupations demarcating location in civil society and in po-
litical recognition. By having a place in the parade, each occupation asserted political au-
thority. Finn impels us to look both backward and forward, to recognize this as a constitu-
tive moment and as the foot on which the community would step forward. He may also 
make us wonder why the idea of a ratification parade is so foreign to our constitutional 
culture today and worry about our civic and constitutional health. 
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